Partnership programme managers in the Reynolds / Spring Coalition, 1993 – 1994: an assessment by O'Halpin, Eunan
                   DCU Business School 
 
                             RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 
    PAPER NO. 6 
    1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partnership Programme Managers in the 
Reynolds / Spring Coalition 
1993 – 1994: An Assessment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eunan O’Halpin 
DCU Business School 
 
 
ISSN 1393-290X 
 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No. 6 
1 
PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME MANAGERS IN THE REYNOLDS / SPRING 
COALITION 
1993-94: AN ASSESSMENT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fianna Fail/Labour (Reynolds/Spring) coalition government which took office in 
January 1993 will be remembered principally for two things.  The first is the 
developments in Anglo-Irish relations and in politics within Northern Ireland which 
culminated in the paramilitary ceasefires of August and October 1994.  The second 
is the bizarre way in which that coalition finally disintegrated amidst indescribable 
confusion and recriminations. 
 
This paper, however, concentrates on one of the less dramatic innovations in the 
practice of Irish government seen during the Reynolds/Spring coalition, the creation 
of a new class of public official, the partnership programme manager.  Together with 
ministerial special advisers, who in one guise or another have been features of  the 
administrative landscape for more than twenty years, programme managers 
constitute a new force in Irish government, operating along the blurred borders 
between politics and administration.  Some see the new combination of advisers and 
managers as the precursors of a full blown ministerial cabinet system along 
European lines, others as an ad hoc expedient of relevance only while coalition 
governments are in power.  This paper reviews the evidence on the innovation to 
date, and suggests further developments which may flow from it. 
 
There is considerable disagreement about aspects of the performance of the first 
cadre of programme managers.  These differences follow obvious fault lines, 
between those who regard such posts as appropriate for civil servants, and those 
who maintain that the Reynolds/Spring coalition demonstrated the superiority of 
political imports over career officials for that kind of work.  The division of opinion 
corresponds to professional rather than to party political demarcations: career civil 
servants who worked as programme managers in 1993/4 are ranged against the 
political imports, all of whom were Labour appointments with the exception of Liam 
Cahill, who was selected by David Andrews of Fianna Fail.  It is scarcely a 
coincidence that it is Cahill,  who plainly feels that Labour programme managers 
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were more effective precisely because of their avowedly political objectives, who has 
done most to publicise the view that career officials were inherently unsuitable for the 
job (Cahill, 1994; Morgan, 1995).  
 
Both factions describe programme managers as providing a new edge to the 
clarification and agreement of policy and to its embodiment in legislation.  However, 
it has also been said that, through judicious selection and organisation of its 
programme managers, the Labour Party benefitted disproportionately during its 
coalition with Fianna Fail because the political people from outside the civil service 
supposedly outsmarted the more cautious career officials on whom most Fianna Fail 
ministers relied.  Sean Duignan, himself a temporary import into government as 
Taoiseach Albert Reynold's press secretary, has written that Labour 'completely 
outmanoeuvred Fianna Fail at programme manager level, particularly when it came 
to the allocation of Euro[pean] structural and cohesion funds' (Duignan, 1995,  89).  
This claim seems to have gained considerable currency in political circles, in part 
perhaps because some Labour programme managers were disposed to court the 
media in a fashion quite alien to career civil servants.  One former Fianna Fail 
member of the Reynolds/Spring coalition, Charlie McCreevy TD, has argued 
coherently against 'the mantra "it is only programme managers from outside the 
public service who are of any use ..."', and he has been at pains to defend the civil 
service generally against 'easy jibes and popular headlines' (McCreevey, 1995, A 
and B).  Career civil servants acknowledge Labour's policy successes in the 
Reynolds/Spring coalition, but attribute this not to failings at the programme manager 
level but to the fact that the Labour leadership entered office with a  more coherent 
set of policy aims, and a clearer view of how to obtain these, than did their Fianna 
Fail partners, conditioned by three years of coalition with the P[rogressive] 
D[emocrat]s to regard policy positions as bargaining chips in the game of coalition 
formation rather than as inalienable principles (private information).  Fianna Fail's 
sheer familiarity with and confidence in the civil service was, they argue,  probably 
also a factor in the party's attitude towards Labour's innovation (O'Halpin, 1993, p. 
197; private information).  Whether or not it is actually true that the political 
appointees outmanoeuvred their civil service analogues in the programme managers 
group, it was probably crucial to Labour that such a claim gained general currency in 
order to help to legitimate the party's alliance with the old Fianna Fail enemy.  Only if 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No. 6 
3 
Labour could portray itself as having an arm lock on Fianna Fail, as the PDs had 
contrived to do during their coalition with Fianna Fail between 1989 and 1992, would 
the leadership be able to contain anti-coalitionist sentiment within the party.  
Furthermore, it was imperative that Labour obtain 'dramatic policy successes' if it 
was to have any hope of avoiding the heavy electoral reverses which have usually 
afflicted the smaller parties after participating in Irish coalition governments (Mitchell, 
1993, p. 117).  It was also important for Labour's political appointees that their 
achievements be publicly known,  in order to counteract the charge against them 
aired by some Labour backbench TD that they wielded 'disproportionate power' as 
the Tanaiste's 'non-elected kitchen cabinet' (Duignan, 1995, 
p. 133). 
 
Irrespective of the merits of the issue, events since the formation of the present 
Bruton/Spring/de Rossa coalition demonstrate that the political imports have won the 
practical argument about programme managers hands down - it is said that an 
incoming Fine Gael minister who had initially selected a civil servant to be his 
programme manager was then upbraided by his party colleagues and forced to 
reverse his decision (private information).  Some observers claim that Fine Gael, a 
number of whose ministers, advisers and programme managers had no personal 
experience of government prior to December 1994, consequently suffered through 
inexperience in their first months in office.  This criticism, however, cannot be made 
of the Taoiseach's appointment as his special adviser and programme manager of 
Mr Sean Donlon, whose unexpected resignation as secretary of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs in January 1987 had surprised everyone (O'Halpin, 1991,  p. 293).    
Only one member of the current Bruton government, Democratic Left's sole cabinet 
representative  Prionsias de Rossa, employs a civil servant as a programme 
manager, and that may be explained partly by the fact that it is the first time that the 
party has played a part in any government.  In the course of 1995 he has, 
furthermore, also assembled a publicly funded 'research unit to provide me with 
advice and analysis on policy proposals which arise on the general Government 
agenda outside my Department'.  This unit of three full-time and two part-time staff 
evidently reflects Mr de Rossa's determination not to lose sight of broad policy issues 
while coping with his own demanding departmental portfolio (Carroll, 1995).    
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THE ORIGINS OF THE PROGRAMME MANAGER SYSTEM 
The programme manager system had its genesis in the facts of Irish electoral life, 
rather than in the tortuous history of mainstream civil service reform over the last 
three decades (Dunne, 1989; Kelly, 1993; O'Halpin, 1991; Stapleton, 1991).  It 
represents a response by Labour to the changing nature of government formation 
brough about by the erosion of Fianna Fail's core electoral support since 1981, which 
culminated in Charles Haughey's acceptance of coalition with the PDs after the 1989 
general election.  That development changed the terms of coalition politics.  From 
being simply devices by which the Fianna Fail devil might be excluded from power 
for a time, coalitions have become the expected form of government, since 1989 
twice accommodating Fianna Fail, and currently keeping that party from office.   
 
The possibilities thrown up by the marked shifts in party electoral fortunes discernible 
since the early 1980s presented particular challenges for the smaller parties in the 
Oireachtas.  The PDs' alliance with Mr Haughey's Fianna Fail in 1989 proved 
surprisingly long lived.  In fact the PDs outlasted Mr Haughey in government, only 
quitting office when the attitude of his successor Albert Reynolds made it impossible 
to remain.  An avowedly policy driven party, the PDs appeared to wield a major 
influence in government.  Whether this was due to some unexpected interparty 
chemistry, to convergence on many policy issues, to Mr Haughey's evident personal 
commitment to appeasing Mr O'Malley and his PD colleagues at every turn, or to a 
combination of these factors, remains a matter for debate ( Mitchell, 1993, pp. 111-
12).  But it is clear that in terms of policy the PDs saw themselves as relatively 
successful while in coalition with Fianna Fail, at least until Mr Reynolds succeeded 
Mr Haughey as Taoiseach in February 1992, even without programme managers or 
any comparable co-ordinating mechanism to help them.  Why, then, did Labour insist 
on such a system from the outset?  The answer presumably lies in the party's 
unhappy experience in the Cosgrave coalition from 1973 to 1977 and in the 
FitzGerald coalitions of 1981-2 and of 1983-7.  Those governments were put 
together with the straightforward aim of excluding Fianna Fail from office.  Policy was 
secondary to this goal.  Although the FitzGerald coalitions did agree some policy 
aspirations, in practice these were watered down or largely forgotten in the rush of 
day to day business.  In that era Labour ministers received little or no policy support 
from their party headquarters, and most of them were too preoccupied with securing 
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a fair crack of the whip for their own departments to look at wider issues.  Labour 
ministers in the FitzGerald coalitions did follow the practice of appointing special 
advisers, but these generally provided essentially political advice and did not become 
involved in any executive roles within departments.  In practice they operated mainly 
as ministerial confidantes.  
 
In December 1992 the Labour leadership did not wish to be sucked into a Fianna Fail 
dominated coalition without a well articulated programme for action and a 
mechanism for securing its implementation.  Such a mechanism would, it was hoped, 
enable the party to maximise its strength in a coalition and to exercise influence 
across a range of issues, including those where Labour ministers had no direct 
responsibility but on which the party itself had some views or definite policy position.  
 (In this connection we may speculate that Labour probably drew lessons from the 
manner in which Mrs Mary Robinson had quite deliberately recast the presidential 
secretariat and had appointed a special adviser from outside the civil service, before 
embarking on what amounted almost to a constitutional revolution in the role of the 
presidency).  What Fianna Fail negotiators found themselves dealing with in the 
wake of the 1992 general election was not simply a potential junior partner seeking a 
certain number of cabinet seats and prestigious portfolios for its senior figures, but a 
policy focussed Labour Party with definite aims across the spectrum of government.  
Labour intended to do more than insist on a comprehensive programme for 
government.  It also wanted an agreed means of ensuring that all policy proposals 
outlined in any prenuptial agreement with Fianna Fail would be subject to informed 
and detailed tracking, fine-tuning and review by trusted officials, the partnership 
programme managers, whose responsibility would be to each minister personally 
rather than to his or her department.  In this conception of things, programme 
managers had a political role in the sense that they would be expected to ensure that 
the government kept to the policy promises made in the negotiations leading to its 
formation.  However, the skills required for the job were primarily managerial or 
administrative, rather than the qualities of political judgement and policy expertise 
which special advisers would be expected to bring to their work (Scally, 1995).  The 
programme managers would ensure that old-style coalitions would be succeeded by 
a genuine interparty partnership where both parties would make it their business to 
deliver on their agreed programme.  To do this, however, they would still need to 
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know the political minds of and have the confidence of their ministers.  Judging by 
the appointments which Labour made, that party thought this an impossible job for 
career civil servants to fill effectively.  The programme managers chosen by Labour 
ministers came from a variety of employment backgrounds in both the public and the 
private sectors - for example, the Tanaiste's programme manager Greg Sparks was 
a practising chartered accountant - but all were personally identified with the Labour 
party.               
 
Fianna Fail adopted a different approach.  Perhaps because they were so 
accustomed to government, its leaders evinced little interest in the problem of how to 
improve policy co-ordination in a coalition. They apparently saw the programme 
manager scheme largely as a device by which Labour could support a few more 
party functionaries and trusted advisers out of the public purse while in coalition. This 
may in turn have influenced their decision to rely almost exclusively on mainstream 
civil servants to fill the new positions, in undeclared contrast to Labour's apparent 
rush to put its party faithful on to the public payroll.  The programme managers 
appointed by Fianna Fail ministers were, with one exception, not party backroom 
boys or political sympathisers with particular managerial or presentational skills, but 
career civil servants with extensive experience in ministerial private offices: the 
Taoiseach Mr Reynolds set the tone by appointing as his programme manager 
Donagh Morgan, who had been private secretary to three Taoisigh in succession.  In 
March 1993 Mr Reynolds told the Dail that programme managers would be 
'responsible within their Departments for ensuring progress on matters arising from 
the Partnership Programme for Government as it relates to their Department', in 
effect a statement of the conventional civil service view of their appropriate functions 
(quoted in Morgan, 1995).  Although some officials had reservations about political 
imports into departments, mainly on grounds of the possible politicisation of 
administration, many senior civil servants quickly came to see the programme 
manager innovation as a good means of providing an effective co-ordinating 
mechanism at an appropriate level between departments (private information).  This 
had been regarded as desirable ever since the publication of the Devlin report in 
1969, while the Association of Higher Civil Servants had highlighted the need for 
'much greater cross-department co-ordination of the Government Programme' in 
1992 (Morgan, 1995).  So long as they were competent at their job, and once it was 
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clear that they would leave office with the ministers who had appointed them, the 
political backgrounds of those programme managers appointed from outside the 
public service came to be seen less as a drawback than as a potential asset 
because they were 'on first name terms with their ministers' and could therefore 
deliver on matters agreed at programme manager level (private information; Morgan, 
1995).  The fact that, unusually for the public service, the rates of pay for the job 
varied from one programme manager to another - the government fixed the salary at 
not more than the maximum of the Principal Officer, Higher Scale - seems not to 
have been the source of any resentment or friction.1      
 
THE SYSTEM IN OPERATION  
The programme manager system has now been in operation for almost three years.  
Its proponents, both civil servants and imports, remain sharply divided on some 
aspects of its workings.  For example, civil servant programme managers during the 
Reynolds/Spring coalition saw it as no part of their function to deal with the press, 
whereas some Labour programme managers consciously used the media.  
Furthermore, Labour programme managers met weekly as a group with Labour 
officials and with some of the party's backbench TDs to review the progress of the 
party's agenda in government; by contrast civil servant programme managers, all of 
whom served Fianna Fail ministers, did not meet as a group to consider whether 
Fianna Fail's policy aims were being achieved. This was a crucial distinction: no 
career civil servant would be comfortable in such a forum.  For this they were 
reproved by Liam Cahill, the only Fianna Fail political import to work as a programme 
manager (Cahill, 1994).  On the other hand, civil servant programme managers have 
argued that as private secretaries to ministers they had had years of experience of 
the political nuances of policy, and were consequently well able to understand the 
party political as well as the administrative agendas of the ministers whom they 
served (private information).  They also maintained that some Labour programme 
managers took time to find their feet because they had no previous inside knowledge 
of how government functioned, and that as a group the Labour appointees, both 
                                                 
 
   
1
  Civil servants were paid by reference to their existing rank.  Political appointees were paid at a rate 
individually agreed with the Department of Finance, usually by reference to an assistant principal or 
principal officer salary scale. 
    Mr Sean Donlon,  who left a senior position in industry to become Mr Bruton's programme manager and 
special adviser, receives the salary of the secretary of a government department.   
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programme managers and special advisers, basked in the reflected glory of two of 
their number, both of whom worked for the Tanaiste Dick Spring: his highly 
experienced special adviser Fergus Finlay, who was, rather confusingly, also 
nominally Mr Spring's programme manager in Foreign Affairs, and his programme 
manager in the Office of the Tanaiste, Greg Sparks.  Mr Finlay was universally 
accepted as speaking directly for the Tanaiste, and he enjoyed particular eminence 
although he seldom attended the weekly meetings of programme managers unless 
he wanted 'to have a go' at somebody (private information from sources in two 
departments).          
 
One aspect of the programme manager experiment which has not been addressed 
by either set of proponents is its influence if any on policy making.  On the face of it 
the system might tend to reinforce ministerial predispositions towards quick fixes in 
areas of policy where a longer term perspective might bring better results.  It would 
be farfetched to suggest that programme managers or other recent innovations such 
as special advisers in Irish administration have created a climate of political 
opportunism at the heart of government;  they may, however, facilitate it.   
 
The two sides of the argument about programme managers agree that the system 
has produced a number of significant benefits.  These include  the exchange of 
information and the co-ordination of action on aspects of policy; the defusing and 
resolution of bi-lateral issues between departments at an appropriate level; and most 
significantly, the orderly and timely advancement of legislative commitments.  This 
last matter is the only one susceptive of external analysis, and it is discussed 
separately below (Cahill, 1994; Morgan, 1995).     
 
THE LEGISLATIVE RECORD 
Assessments of a government's 'performance', and attribution of credit or blame,  is 
a particularly difficult and subjective exercise.  However, the principal public 
protagonists in the programme managers debate both focus on laws passed as one 
key indicator of the innovation's effectiveness.  Although they disagree sharply on 
much else, they say that the system produced 'a quantity and quality of legislation of 
unprecedented proportions' (Cahill, 1994) and 'an unprecedented volume of 
legislation ... 74 Bills were enacted in just under two years' (Morgan, 1995).  
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Unfortunately, however, this accord is marred by the fact that both writers are under 
a shared illusion.  Analysis of the legislative record of the Reynolds/Spring 
government demonstrates that there is nothing 'unprecedented' about the volume of 
primary legislation passed into law in 1993 and 1994.    
 
The legislative record does show that there was a marked increase in the volume of 
public acts passed during 1993, the first full year of operation of the programme 
manager experiment.  The number of public acts went up from twenty nine to forty, 
an increase of over forty per cent.  But 1994 saw only thirty four new bills pass into 
law.  Taken together the figures for the two years provide little evidence that 
programme managers made a great difference to the flow of legislation.  In historical 
terms, even the 1993 figure of forty laws is unexceptional - the second FitzGerald 
coalition got more acts through in its first year in office, while Fianna Fail did even 
better during Charles Haughey's first full year as Taoiseach.  No government of any 
persuasion in recent times comes close to matching the legislative performance of 
Cumann na na nGaedhael in 1923, 1924 and 1931, Fianna Fail in 1933, 1936 and 
1947, or that of the second Costello interparty government in 1956 (Table One).  It 
may be argued that primary legislation passed in any one year is far too crude and 
undiscriminating a measure to use - it is obviously not possible to measure the 
quality and complexity of laws put through the Oireachtas since the advent of 
programme managers - but a simple numerical count is better than nothing, and it is 
the main indicator which both sides of the argument have chosen to highlight to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the new system.     
 
In the absence of any hard data, it is impossible to judge the validity of a related 
claim put forward by both factions.  This is that the advent of the programme 
manager system wrought a transformation in relations between those departments 
framing legislation and the Office of the Attorney General, the department 
responsible for putting draft bills in their appropriate legal form.  Long before Father 
Brendan Smyth was ever heard of in Merrion Street, it was notorious for delay 
(Dooney, 1995; Scally, 1995; private information).  In May 1923 the Attorney General 
Hugh Kennedy complained that an attack on his office by Kevin O’Higgins, the 
dynamic and acerbic Minister for Home Affairs, ‘takes my breath away’.  A year later 
WT Cosgrave, writing in terms to be ruefully echoed by Albert Reynolds sixty years 
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later, told Kennedy that ‘I cannot but think that there is something seriously wrong in 
the administration of a Department’ where important matters ‘are allowed to remain 
undealt with for so long’.2  One of the by-products of the weekly Wednesday morning 
meetings of programme managers instituted under the Reynolds/Spring coalition 
was a Thursday morning meeting of a Legislation Committee at which the Attorney 
General reported on the progress of  bills in process of drafting.  These meetings 
frequently brought to light instances when the sponsoring departments were at fault, 
and disposed of the time honoured departmental excuse that draft bills had 
disappeared into the black hole of the Attorney General's Office.  The net effect, 
apparently, was greatly to clarify and to accelerate the drafting process (Cahill, 1994; 
Morgan, 1995; private information).  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The use of political appointees for the programme manager function parallels recent 
initiatives within Irish political parties towards developing and formalising policy 
formulation functions at headquarters level.  There are obvious precedents:  Dr 
Martin Mansergh, the eminence grise of Mr Reynolds' Northern Ireland policy, has in 
the last decade served both as a salaried adviser in Fianna Fail headquarters when 
the party was in opposition, and as special adviser on Northern Ireland to successive 
Fianna Fail Taoisigh, while Ivan Doherty, previously the general secretary of Fine 
Gael, is now ensconced in the public service as programme manager to the Minister 
for Trade and Tourism Enda Kenny.  Such revolving door appointments may become 
the norm once the draft legislation currently before the Dail on state funding for 
political parties becomes law and provides an assured level of finance for party work. 
 If this prediction holds good No. 13 Upper Mount Street and the other party 
headquarters, 'traditionally little more than electoral campaigning clubs' mainly 
populated by expert constituency strategists and fund raisers, may increasingly be 
staffed by people who will deal continually with policy development even when their 
party is out of office, and who will move into the administration whenever their party 
is in government.  If so, the programme manager experiment may be a further step 
in the transformation of Irish parties into political organisations with the capacity for 
                                                 
    
2
  Kennedy to O'Higgins, 31 May 1923; Cosgrave to Kennedy, 30 Apr. 1924, University College 
Dublin Archives, Kennedy papers, P4/760 and P4/493. 
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the sustained development and public projection of coherent and distinctive policies 
on every aspect of national affairs (anon., 1996).  
   
CONCLUSION 
Programme managers appear set to become a standard feature of Irish 
administrative life, at least under coalition governments.  Furthermore, it is possible 
that they will be retained under single party governments as well, should any be 
elected in the near future.  The desirability of a co-ordinating mechanism at an 
administrative level between departments, at least in relation to legislation, had been 
identified by civil servants even before it became a political imperative.  Once Labour 
decided to strike a deal with Albert Reynolds, it became the conventional wisdom 
amongst politicians as well.  The Labour view that the programme manager position 
should be held by party appointees rather than by career civil servants has now won 
over Fine Gael, their major coalition partner.  When in opposition Mr Bruton made 
much of the influx of political appointees into the Reynolds/Spring coalition on 
grounds both of unnecessary cost and of the unhealthy politicisation of 
administration; he has, arguably, now politicised administration further by appointing 
the same person to fill the two roles of special adviser and programme manager 
within his own department.  A few independent minded politicians such as Charlie 
McCreevey may continue to argue that civil servants make exemplary (and perhaps 
cheaper) programme managers.  The likelihood nevertheless is that all parties will 
endorse the useful proposition that such functions can only be discharged by political 
appointees, once they identify suitable candidates for the positions, if only because 
this will enable the employment of party staff on the public payroll, thereby easing the 
burden on party funds.  The result may be the development of increasingly 
professional party bureaucracies, largely funded from the public purse, absorbed not 
simply in problems of party organisation and vote maximisation but in policy 
development, and ready to play a key role in the machinery of government whenever 
their parties are in power.        
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